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Tax in Development: Towards a Strategic Aid Approach 
 
Olav Lundstøl 
 
Summary 
 
Raising a higher share of the value added in an economy for the public purpose is 
associated with state building, modern economic growth and development. From 2002-3 to 
date, low- and lower-middle income countries raised total tax and non-tax revenue from 11-
12 per cent and 18-19 per cent of GDP up to 17-18 per cent and 25-26 per cent of GDP in 
2014-15. Continuing to improve tax systems is key to realising the development dividend 
available today through improved technology and institutions, whereby it is possible to raise 
living standards faster and at lower cost. The remaining development challenges are 
significant for the majority of the world’s population and therefore the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed in 2015 to address these challenges. The majority 
of the financing for the SDGs must come from domestic sources (as it did with the Millennium 
Development Goals, with a 77 per cent share). This being the case, it is surprising that in 
2015 only 0.13 per cent of global official development assistance was utilised to promote 
improved tax and revenue systems. With the Addis Ababa Agenda and the Addis Tax 
Initiative, this is changing, and several donors and partners are in the process of scaling up 
support to domestic resource mobilisation and tax system reforms. Therefore, it is of 
relevance to share some thoughts on the underlying objectives and justification for raising 
domestic revenues, experiences with revenue and tax-related aid, and a first-level layer 
framework for assessment of potential partner countries (low- and lower-middle). A ranking 
exercise is presented, utilising some key economic indicators such as income, poverty, 
financing levels of expenditure and investment (domestic and foreign), tax effort, tax aid, and 
a political and institutional assessment. This paper finds a significant group of developing 
countries that receive limited assistance and have both large needs and large potential in 
terms of tax and revenue. The top ten countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. Links are 
provided to the Norwegian partner country categorisation to illustrate the correlation between 
these two types of country ranking/prioritisation. Finally, other factors relating to donor-
partner analysis and dialogue are discussed, including political and administrative 
prioritisation of revenue reforms, absorptive capacity in institutions, and the likelihood of 
particular interventions delivering results.  
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Introduction 
 
This discussion paper represents a working document which briefly summarises: 
 evidence and arguments for the importance of tax1 in development; 
 tax and the financing of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda; 
 status, cost effectiveness and principles of tax aid in development; 
 a basic framework for assessment of partner countries for tax aid; 
 elements of further donor-partner country dialogue and identification for tax aid.    
 
It is important to emphasise that this document represents one element of work in the 
development of a Norwegian strategy, plan and institutional response to the Addis Tax 
Initiative commitment made in 2015. It is hoped that this may be of interest to both donor and 
partner countries, as well as to the overall international community involved in development. 
Today, many donors and partner countries are currently engaged in different forms of 
preparations for scaling up their aid in the area of tax and non-tax related public revenue 
assistance.  
 
The paper presents a first-level layer of assessment of the need and potential for tax aid2 as 
seen through a set of economic indicators. The emphasis is on a country’s ability to finance 
both the state budget and related key private expenditures (of households and businesses). 
Further assessments are obviously necessary, and for many donors, it is likely that the 
process to identify potential partner countries, public revenue themes and ways to deliver 
such aid will be decided based on, for example, proven partner country commitment to public 
revenue reforms and absorptive capacity, as well as an assessment of likelihood of positive 
results.  
 
Following the basic framework developed in this paper to scope the need and potential for 
tax aid in developing countries, others may want to extend and/or adjust this to include other 
criteria. Other tools typically utilised include external country assessments; national 
development and revenue strategies and plans; diagnostic assessments of tax administration 
and policy, and domestic versus international tax issues; recent collection and use of public 
revenues; and political economy and institutional studies.  
 
 
1  Fundamentals of tax in development 
 
1.1 State, modern economic growth and revenue 
 
The payment of tax has long been associated with a country’s degree of societal 
organisation as well as with increased use of rule-based institutions. Tilly (1992) provided a 
millennial perspective focusing in particular on taxation in state building in early modern 
Europe from A.D. 990-1992. State financing, military power and security for citizens and 
inhabitants in specific geographic areas was central. However, why is there really a need for 
taxation? In principle, both the private and the public sector can utilise available resources 
(natural and manmade) to carry out tasks and to produce goods and services. In some 
areas, this can be delivered more effectively by the public sector than by each individual or 
by firms. This has to do with market imperfections (information and coordination failures), 
                                                          
1  The term ‘tax’ is herein used somewhat interchangeably with domestic revenue mobilisation (DRM), revenue and public 
revenue throughout the document. We highlight the difference in particular as it relates to tax or revenue estimates and 
targets, to emphasise what is included. 
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and the public good characteristics present in some goods and service areas. Among these 
are, for example public safety, law, infrastructure, education, health, and providing an 
enabling and regulatory framework for citizens and businesses.  
 
As shown by Lindert (2004), in most developed economies, modern economic growth from 
the late nineteenth century went together with much higher ratios of total public revenue (tax 
and non-tax) to income. A radical example of this is the case of public spending in the social 
sectors in Europe and the USA, which increased from 1 to 25 per cent of GDP from 1900 to 
2000. The relationship of civil rights and duties within a jurisdiction is at the centre of the 
social fiscal contract between citizens and rulers. Different selection and election processes 
can show citizens’ revealed preferences in terms of governments that can provide them with 
the best goods and services for the least cost (tax), but these systems depend on access to 
and use of the right to vote. The connection between tax and governance manifests itself in 
different ways. Moore (2008) summarises three. The first is continuous bargaining between 
citizens and the state, where the payment of tax and the delivery of public goods and 
services are at the centre. The second is through the state’s incentive to promote growth 
because public finances depend on it through tax. Finally, tax collection critically depends on 
the quality of institutions and organisations.  
 
1.2 Revenue capacity and potential in developing countries 
 
Revenue collection, as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), tends to rise with higher 
income levels (see Figure 1 below). Similar to the experience referred to above for 
developed countries, recent literature clearly strengthens the argument for stronger revenue 
systems in developing countries also, to promote service delivery and development for the 
majority. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), increased tax capacity up to 
certain levels has also been associated with higher rates of economic growth for both 
developed and developing countries (Gaspar, Jaramillo and Wingender 2016). Meheus and 
McIntyre (2017) provide recent global data showing that there is not a 1:1 relationship 
between the level of GDP and public revenues (which in this case includes social 
contributions, grants and other revenues as well as tax). They do find a positive but 
somewhat weak relationship, however, with a correlation of 0.387 on average. This finding 
relates both to fundamental differences in the structure of the economy and its governance, 
as well as policy and compliance. The collection of tax is often positively associated with 
improved overall governance including, specifically, democratic accountability and lower 
corruption. For the period 1990-2005, this holds on average across sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), according to a study by Baskaran and Bigsten (2013).  
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Figure 1: Global tax revenue levels (including social security costs – SSC3) as a 
percentage of GDP by country income group 
 
 
Source: Jukka Pirtilla, Thinking of WIDER Tax Research, UNU-WIDER Presentation, October 2017 
 
There is a longstanding discussion about what represents an appropriate level and 
composition of tax revenue considering different factors such as effectiveness in the delivery 
of services and goods, economic growth and sustainable development. It is unlikely that 
there is one answer to this question that applies across time and place as both the efficiency 
and effectiveness conditions can fundamentally change.  
 
Despite this, there is today mounting evidence that tax collection levels below 15 per cent of 
GDP4 tend to be insufficient to establish and maintain a minimum welfare state, to promote 
sustained economic development (World Bank 2017b). Manuel and Hoy (2015) indicate a 
median revenue capacity (tax and non-tax) requirement of 18 and 26 per cent of GDP for 
low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) respectively. 
Notwithstanding the progress reflected in Figure 1 above regarding total revenue (tax and 
non-tax) collection in most developing countries over the last few decades, there is still little 
doubt that there is potential remaining to increase public revenue in many developing 
countries. Ranges of estimates from tax effort5 and gap6 studies vary from a potential 
increase of 20-70 per cent of current tax levels collected across developing countries.  
 
                                                          
3  Note that for most low-income countries and many lower-middle income countries social security costs are small due to 
a large formal sector and limited pension rights. For upper-middle income and high-income countries, this is significantly 
different.  
4  This refers specifically only to tax and does not include non-tax revenues.  
5  Utilising methods and models to estimate to what extent a country’s level of tax collection (tax/GDP) is low or high when 
comparing to other countries and adjusting for income level, structure of the economy, urbanisation and governance 
factors.  
6  Usually an estimate of the difference between the total amounts of taxes owed to the government versus the amount 
they actually collect, considering the available information about the economy, taxpayers, tax legislation and the 
relevant documentation available.  
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Moore and Prichard (2017) provide a menu of what they call ‘dangling fruit’ in terms of areas 
with the highest potential to increase total revenue in low-income countries. They indicate 
that each of these areas have the potential to increase the total revenue take by 1-2 per cent 
of GDP over a five to ten-year period. The majority are under domestic control, albeit linked 
to international tax issues, thereby indicating that progress is possible nationally with specific 
policy and implementation. The list includes: transfer mispricing in international economic 
transactions; mining, tobacco and alcohol; exemptions; implementing VAT; taxing the rich; 
property taxes; and turning government institutions and enterprises into better taxpayers. 
The challenge may be more political than technical in most countries, and the equity, growth, 
governance and fiscal effects significantly different.  
 
Today, 65 developing countries collect below 15 per cent of GDP from tax and in many of 
these, aid accounts for more than 10 per cent of GDP (World Bank 2017b). This is despite 
the fact that the group of low-income countries dropped from 63 to 34 countries from 2000 to 
date (and may decline to 16 countries by 2030). It shows that the challenge of inadequate 
levels of domestic public revenue collection to deliver adequate public services, promote 
growth, reduce poverty and achieve development is present in both low and lower-middle-
income countries (as well as others). Different sub categories of countries have different 
characteristics and needs when it comes to building effective tax systems. Related to this, it 
is also noteworthy that extreme poverty will be increasingly concentrated over the next 
decades in fragile states, where by 2035 up to 80 per cent of the world’s poor will live. The 
majority of this extremely poor population will be living in Africa (OECD 2015).  
 
1.3 Tax increase and fiscal incidence 
 
However, how tax collection/capacity rise also matters for development. One example is the 
effect of increased resource tax collection on non-resource tax in SSA in recent decades. 
This represents both an element of and a manifestation of the ‘resource curse’ in practice: an 
overemphasis on resource-related sectors and revenues can either directly affect the 
allocation of the factors of production to non-resource areas or/and enable a ‘ruler rent 
seeking behaviour’ where the incentive to focus on a broad tax base is low (Subramanian 
and Sala-i-Martin 2003). Crivelli and Gupta (2014) show that in the period from 1992-2009 on 
average a 1 per cent of GDP equivalent rise in resource tax collected reduced non-resource 
tax collection by 0.3 per cent of GDP in a group of 35 resource-rich developing countries.   
 
Beyond the resource versus non-resource dichotomy in tax and development, there are a 
number of other topics. These include for example trade versus consumption taxes, and 
indirect versus direct taxes. McNabb and LeMay-Boucher (2014) find that the effects of 
different taxes on growth vary according to a country’s income level, and that revenue-
neutral increases in personal income taxes or social contributions have been harmful for long 
run per capita GDP growth. Similarly, the shift from trade taxes to consumption taxes has 
had only modestly positive effects on growth for lower-middle-income countries.  
 
These findings clearly indicate that advice and conditionality related to tax policy reforms in 
developing countries should be crafted considering a country’s stage of development and 
actual historical experience, and transitions in comparable situations across time and place. 
Much too often, generic advice and thinking based on first best from an orthodox economic 
efficiency point of view across time and place is given with great confidence to governments. 
This potentially has important implications both for reform-shifts from the broad categories 
such as trade/foreign taxes to domestic taxes, as well as within categories such as how to 
tax consumption and income.    
 
Recently, Lustig (2017) has provided clear indications based on a number of detailed fiscal 
incidence studies that many developing countries have regressive policies and practices both 
on the revenue and expenditure side. The main negative effects tend to be associated with 
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how consumption taxes and the pattern of social expenditure-service delivery affect poverty 
in particular. In such a situation, increased revenues may have mixed effects on inequality 
and poverty overall.  
 
 
2  Development, sources of financing and 
expenditure 
 
2.1 Development, cost and financing models 
 
The pace of economic and human development progress intensified from the nineteenth to 
the twentieth century and onwards. What previously had taken many centuries or 
millenniums to achieve was now often happening in much less than a century. Over the last 
century, life expectancy more than doubled at the global level, from 31 to 66 years. In Africa, 
a similar improvement took place with an increase from 25 to 51 years (Casabonne and 
Kenny 2011).  
 
Improvements in technology available at lower prices (e.g. medicines and vaccines), 
combined with widespread access to this technology (due to higher income levels) and 
increased usage (due to improved literacy and education), have together had a large impact 
on development outcomes. Improved policies, programmes, organisations and institutions 
within gradually changing governance frameworks have also contributed towards this at 
different levels. It is also notable, however, that progress in many areas (health, for example) 
often did not stop or regress even in countries and regions with weak institutions and slow 
economic growth (Casabonne and Kenny 2011).  
 
Due to the overall improvements in assets (at individual, household and societal level) and 
their productive use, it was possible in 1999 to achieve the same average life expectancy as 
in 1870 with only one-tenth of the income level (US$300/PPP/CAP (purchasing power parity; 
per capita) versus US$3,000/PPP/CAP). Another indication of progress is how much real 
income is needed to secure a minimum level of calories to avoid food poverty (Casabonne 
and Kenny 2011).  
 
It has therefore been possible in recent history to reduce poverty and improve livelihood 
conditions significantly faster than it has been previously. Investment in social and productive 
capital has on average been highly productive in particular in the developing world over 
several decades. This also applies to specific areas, for example it has been established that 
in many poor countries, securing one additional year of schooling has been associated with a 
10 per cent higher salary level (however, this has been measured mainly in the formal 
sector).7  
 
Exactly how these improvements have happened has varied significantly across countries 
and over a period of time. There have been large variations in terms of the respective roles 
of the private and the public sector regarding the financing and/or payment of expenditures 
including investments and consumption to produce/deliver goods and services. There can be 
great variance both between countries at similar income and development levels and 
between those at greatly diverging income and development levels. In low-income countries 
in Africa, for example, in the education sector, the direct payment of costs by households 
varies between around 10-60 per cent of the costs in primary school (Niger to Togo), 10-80 
                                                          
7  www.globalpartnership.org/data-and-results/education-data 
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per cent of the costs for secondary school (Mali to Rwanda) and 5-75 per cent of the costs 
for tertiary school (Malawi to Guinea).8  
 
2.2 Financing for development  
 
The fundamental source of most financing for development throughout history has always 
been domestic. This is the case for both private and public sector investment and 
consumption. Today, total revenues (tax and non-tax) in Africa amount to ten times that of 
aid and three to four times that of aid, foreign direct investment and remittances put together 
(Fjeldstad and Lundstøl 2017). External influences, through technology, innovation and 
financing and capital, have also played important roles in many countries in critical periods of 
transformation and will continue to do so across the developing world.   
 
Ndikumana and Blankson (2015) provide a further indication of the importance of domestic 
sources in the financing of development by examining the relative importance of different 
domestic and foreign sources when it comes to total investment in Africa. They decompose 
the main sources of domestic investment in 50 African countries for the period 1970-2012. 
Domestic savings and domestic credit were the main drivers behind this investment (17-30 
per cent of GDP in the period covered). External sources of financing such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) had a small but positive effect on investment levels (1-4 per cent of GDP), 
whereas external debt levels had a negative but not significant effect. Trade and the current 
account also had substantial influence on investment while the fiscal deficit did not. In the 
same study, aid (2.5-8 per cent of GDP) and personal remittances (1-3.5 per cent of GDP) 
seemed to have limited direct impact on investment, indicating that the majority financed 
consumption (public and private) and humanitarian aid. Note however that the distinction 
between consumption and investment is not always obvious, as the financing of health, 
education and other recurrent social sector consumption-expenditures represent investment 
in human capital.  
 
How do the above findings, looking specifically at investments and recent figures for different 
sources of financing for development, fit with the expectations related to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)? Regarding the actual financing of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), 77 per cent of funding came from developing countries’ own domestic 
resources.9 This attests to the importance and potential of emphasising the role of domestic 
resource mobilisation. The SDGs set out an ambitious agenda for 2030 with 17 general goals 
and a multitude of underlying targets. The needs/gap to reach the goals in terms of public 
finance requirements have been estimated as high as 27 per cent and 7 per cent of GDP for 
low and lower-middle income countries (Cobham and Klees 2016). It is doubtful that such a 
high increase in public expenditure is realistic considering current government revenue levels 
in poor countries as well as in developed countries. However, it still illustrates the magnitude 
of the challenge for the poorest developing countries in particular and the potential need to 
prioritise the poorest countries.  
 
2.3 Tax potential and efficient service delivery 
 
It is important to retain reservations regarding an uncritical scaling up or maximisation of 
public revenue through taxation in all countries through all available means. What this paper 
wants to promote is rather a strong revenue system and moving closer to optimal tax and 
non-tax collection: not a theoretical ‘first best’ option, but a practical one given local 
characteristics and restrictions. Long and Miller (2017) emphasise the importance of utilising 
a whole of government approach, linking tax to public service delivery and the SDGs. They 
                                                          
8  https://ourworldindata.org/global-rise-of-education, Section 1.2. 
9  www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/rr-financing-sustainable-development-goals-110615-en.pdf, 
p4. 
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show that already, many developing countries have high tax capacity (tax/GDP) and tax 
effort (tax collection considering the income level, structure of the economy and governance 
characteristics). Therefore, improved revenue systems, compatible with higher rates of 
saving, investment, growth, equity and poverty reduction, need to be at the core of any public 
revenue strategy.  
 
Pritchett and Aiyar (2015) ask whether and when tax constitutes a fair ‘price of civilisation’ or 
a ‘tribute to Leviathan’. The first view argues the need to retain an element of the value 
added in the economy to fund public goods and services associated with civilisation in 
modern states. The second is the challenge that in most countries taxation contains 
elements of distortions, such that the payment does not equate to the cost of efficient public 
goods and service delivery. This can be significant and contribute to retain a vicious circle of 
low tax morale/compliance with poor service delivery. Slemrod (2016: 4) refers to a slightly 
different but related challenge: ‘Revenue… may be low because the only taxes it is feasible 
to raise impose a high social cost, one not warranted by the productivity of government 
revenue.’  
 
Moore and Prichard (2017) similarly emphasise the importance of achieving equity and 
reducing the corruption and rent extraction of the rentiers. Moore (2015) explores why the tax 
governance dividend may not happen, since rulers can shape the bargaining agenda around 
revenues. This advantage can be misused to retain or segment citizens/taxpayers into 
competing political groups. In summary, there is a strong reminder in the literature on tax and 
development that it matters ‘how tax is collected, from whom and how the revenue is spent’ 
(Moore and Prichard 2017: 6). Nevertheless, in contrast to Long and Miller (2017), Moore 
and Prichard argue strongly that ‘there are good reasons for the governments of many low-
income countries to take advantage of the current international consensus to find ways of 
raising additional revenue’ (Moore and Prichard 2017: 6).  
 
 
3  A brief overview of tax aid in development  
 
3.1 International commitments of tax aid 
 
The importance of domestic resource mobilisation (DRM), both private and public, was clear 
already in the financing for development conference in Monterrey in 2002. Another high-level 
meeting on development partnerships, in Mexico in 2014, delivered the following statement: 
no developing country should be overly dependent on other countries’ resources for its own 
development. Still, development priority, and programming and technical cooperation in 
particular, focus so far mainly on the expenditure side. Granted, there has been an emphasis 
on the income side in public financial management and macroeconomic initiatives in 
development, but this has been more from a stabilisation and balance of public accounts 
perspective.  
 
The negotiations that led to the 2015 SDGs and the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI) developed the 
importance of DRM. One of the SDGs, SDG 17.1, specifically encourages increased 
international efforts to: ‘strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through 
international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other 
revenue collection’.10 The ATI specifically outlines the following commitments up to 2020 and 
beyond:11  
 Double the level of technical cooperation related to DRM/tax by 2020. 
 Increase the focus on taxation as a vehicle to reach the SDGs by 2030. 
                                                          
10  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17 
11  www.addistaxinitiative.net/  
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 Confirm the commitment to harmonised national policies that affect development. 
 Enable developing country implementation of the international tax agenda, such as 
the OECD/G20 BEPS project and the new global standard on Automatic Exchange of 
Information (AEOI).  
 Include developing countries in the global tax discussion in relevant international 
forums. 
 Strengthen the taxation and management of revenues from natural resources.  
 
At the request of the G20, the World Bank (WB), IMF, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the UN formed a global platform in 2016 to 
collaborate more effectively in the area of tax and capacity development (The Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax – PCT). In a conference organised in Berlin in June 2017 by the ATI 
Secretariat, the first comprehensive OECD data on the donor financing of domestic resource 
mobilisation in development was presented.  
 
3.2 Actual international tax aid  
 
The ATI DRM report (ATI 2017) confirms that so far, donor support in this area has been 
limited, at US$224 million in disbursement in 2015, or, in relative terms, only 0.13 per cent of 
official development assistance (ODA). Table 1 below shows this for the top 10 donor 
countries in relative terms. Within the framework of the abovementioned international 
commitments of doubling DRM aid and related actions, so far 39 countries have signed the 
ATI (of which 20 are donor and 19 are partner/developing countries), as well as 12 
supporting organisations.  
 
The efforts so far continue to be somewhat concentrated in a few countries on both the donor 
and the developing country sides. The United Kingdom, United States and Germany account 
for above 60 per cent of all funding. About one-third of bilateral DRM funding until recently 
went to just three countries (Afghanistan, Tanzania and Mozambique). The least developed 
countries did receive the largest share of funding (47 per cent of disbursements and 57 per 
cent of commitments), but as many as 34 developing countries received less than 1 per cent 
of all tax-related aid, and a sub-group of 26 low income and lower-middle-income countries 
did not receive any direct tax aid. It would also appear that the countries with the lowest tax 
collection, below 15 per cent of GDP, received the most tax aid (50 per cent of 
disbursements and 59 per cent of commitments) (OECD 2017 and IMF/WBG/OECD/UN 
2016).  
 
Table 1 ODA to DRM: top 10 donors (for 2015) 
Disbursements       Commitments       
Country ODA to DRM 
(US$ million) 
% of 
total 
ODA to 
DRM 
ODA to 
DRM 
as % of 
country 
ODA 
Country ODA to DRM 
(US$ million) 
% of 
total 
ODA to 
DRM 
ODA to 
DRM 
as % of 
country 
ODA 
United Kingdom 40.83 23.39 0.22 United 
Kingdom 
61.04 33.64 0.46 
United States 36.79 21.08 0.12 Germany 31.72 17.48 0.15 
Germany 29.79 17.06 0.17 United States 26.88 14.82 0.08 
Norway 13.73 7.87 0.32 Norway 14.09 7.77 0.30 
Sweden 8.85 5.07 0.12 Switzerland 7.81 4.30 0.25 
Canada 7.32 4.19 0.17 Finland 7.13 3.93 0.81 
Denmark 7.12 4.08 0.28 Denmark 6.99 3.85 0.28 
Switzerland 5.75 3.29 0.16 Belgium 6.66 3.67 0.32 
France 5.69 3.26 0.06 France 5.81 3.20 0.04 
Finland 4.54 2.60 0.35 Canada 4.47 2.46 0.08 
Source: OECD 2017 
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When assessing international DRM aid, it is important to note that there is still a significant 
methodological and reporting challenge linked to capturing all DRM aid globally. The largest 
gap is most likely when such aid is channelled through the multilateral financial institutions 
(IMF and WB) but possibly also to some extent through the African Development Bank 
(AFDB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). This includes both programming that is only DRM-related but also in particular public 
finance management (PFM) and macroeconomic initiatives and donor funds with multiple 
objectives and areas of work including DRM.  
 
An indication of the above was provided in a recent WB evaluation report of all identified 
support to tax policy and administration assistance in the period 2005-15. In this period, a 
total budget of US$28.4 billion was committed to 205 projects in 107 countries. Most of these 
projects were programmatic development policy operations with investment projects 
involving tax only accounting for 11 per cent. Most of the funds were committed in middle-
income countries (78 per cent) with a tax collection rate of 10-20 per cent of GDP, whereas 
low-income countries only received a small share (5 per cent). On average, the estimate is 
that 10-14 per cent of the support had a tax reform component, translating into an average of 
US$280-400 million per year in tax aid. This amount alone represents a higher amount than 
all other international tax aid in 2015 (WB 2017a and ATI 2017). It is likely that tax aid 
provided by the IMF and other international financial institutions (IFIs) is also significantly 
underreported in OECD and ATI data. 
 
 
4  Fundamentals of tax aid: focus, cost 
effectiveness and capacity 
 
4.1 Potential tax capacity upside and policy-administration divide  
 
In principle, it should be possible to establish a set of criteria and indicators concerning the 
need and potential for tax aid in developing countries. Section 5 and Appendix 1 examine in 
more detail such economic and development indicators for low and lower-middle income 
countries, focusing in particular on income and poverty, savings, credit, investment and 
expenditure, and net foreign financing.  
 
Beyond this framework for a first preliminary assessment regarding allocation of tax aid, 
there are also a number of tax specific indicators. At the aggregate level in terms of tax 
capacity (tax/GDP), a fundamental starting point for estimating the potential would seem to 
be the level of tax effort. This indicator tries to estimate to what extent a country is collecting 
a low, high or just right level of taxes when compared to other countries, adjusting for 
differences in levels of income, structure of the economy, urbanisation, formalisation and 
governance along key dimensions.  
 
Clearly, this is a difficult exercise, but it can still provide a useful indication for many 
countries, in particular when used together with other relevant tax indicators. In principle, tax 
effort estimates could provide an indication of where the potential upside is highest without 
overtaxing the economy. Recent work by Ananou and Houngbonon (2015) shows that the 
level of tax effort (called ‘tax gap’ in their paper, but basically reflecting the same as a 
calculation of tax effort) stayed flat in Africa over the last decade. This may confirm some 
scope for public policy and administrative reform efforts to close the gap and increase public 
revenues. Long and Miller (2017) to some extent question this by showing high average tax 
efforts in many developing regions, including in Africa.  
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It is important here to note some limitations with regard to tax effort estimates. These entail a 
comparison across time and place of the level of tax collected (as a share of GDP) adjusted 
for structural and governance characteristics. As already noted, however, even adjusting for 
all these factors, the appropriate level of tax collected and the role of the state in delivering 
goods and services has changed dramatically over time, and even from decade to decade. In 
addition, these estimates depend critically on the development strategy and model chosen, 
which also varies between regions and within regions. Note that a strong case for improved 
taxation exists also for countries with a high tax effort but, in this context, with an emphasis 
on improving the effectiveness of the tax system (policy and administration) and not 
necessarily raising the level of revenue collected (tax/GDP).  
 
Recent work has been trying to separate to what extent a low tax effort or large tax gap is 
due to problems with tax policy and/or administration and compliance (see Keen and 
Slemrod 2017). Note however also the circularity problem related to tax gap estimates (if 
there is no legislation to tax a specific item (e.g. capital gains), then it will not be identified as 
a gap if it is not taxed (Moore and Prichard 2017: 7)). Furthermore, there are today a number 
of tax diagnostics (covering both policy and administration) and databases with updated 
performance data for tax administrations (for example RA-FIT (Revenue Administration 
Fiscal Information Tool) and ISORA (International Survey On Revenue Administration) at the 
IMF.12 These can often provide a useful basis for assessment work to decide on the need for 
and the design of assistance strategies and programmes.  
 
Narrowing down from the national level assessment and selection process, there is a 
significant literature and experience considering which potential areas to focus on, often 
segmented, for example by: tax policy and tax administration; domestic and international 
taxes; resource and non-resource taxes; direct and indirect taxes; national and local taxes; 
formal and informal taxes. It is also possible to think of assistance in the areas of research, 
media, justice, accountability and transparency related to tax systems.  
 
4.2 Cost effectiveness of tax aid 
 
Regarding the cost-effectiveness of tax aid, this paper refers only to some general dilemmas 
and a few examples (more details are available in other reports13). As with most aid, an 
overall note and disclaimer is necessary regarding attribution of results and impact at the 
aggregate level in country and in a sector. Tax aid is, more often than not, only an element of 
and a contribution to larger national strategies, plans and programmes. A clear example is 
the donor effort through the IMF’s Tax Policy and Administration Topical Trust Fund (TPA-
TTF).14 From 2011-2016 it assisted 21 countries through assistance and advisory services 
with varying focus, effort and duration. In these countries, tax collection on average 
increased from 14.5 to 16.2 per cent of GDP in the period of assistance. This is a very 
significant result, despite the issue of attribution, considering that the cost of all these 
assistance projects (including also a number of global data, research and regional projects) 
was just US$30 million.  
 
In some countries and with certain tax aid interventions it is sometimes possible to ascribe 
and attribute influence more directly in terms of tax collection. This applies to assistance with 
improving and carrying out tax audits of international enterprises and certain sectors (e.g. 
extractives). OECD report that through their Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) 
programme they have contributed to an increase in tax collection of US$245 million through 
21 such projects.  
 
                                                          
12  RA-FIT has now been replaced by ISORA as the survey tool utilised.  
13  See for example OECD (2015) and WB (2017a).  
14  The TPA-TTF has now been replaced by another tax trust fund at the IMF, the Revenue Mobilization Trust Fund 
(RMTF).  
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In Zambia, the national tax authority report that due to an institutional cooperation with the 
Norwegian Tax Authority (NTA), they have increased collection through tax reassessments 
by 635 million Norwegian Krone (NOK) (around US$80.6 million) in the period 2011 to 2016. 
The total cost of this assistance was NOK66 million (around US$8.4 million), representing a 
cost-benefit ratio of 1:10. In the same period, the Government of Zambia quadrupled the 
number of tax audits it carried out and doubled its number of employees. Similarly, in 
Tanzania the Norwegian Tax Authority assisted the removal of a large backlog of tax audits 
in the mining sector from 2012 to 2015 at a cost of NOK9 million (around US$1.14 million). 
This resulted in multiple outputs and improvements, including one company paying an 
estimated NOK1 billion (around US$127 million) in additional taxes due to reassessments. 
The equivalent cost-benefit ratio was at least 1:100, taking into account only the largest tax 
reassessments and collection.  
 
4.3 Capacity development through tax aid 
 
Several recent reports and documents by international institutions such as the IMF, WB, 
OECD and the UN15 describe the experience of providing external assistance to developing 
countries in building tax capacity to mobilise national resources to finance development. 
Developing capacity in general in a country or at regional and higher levels requires 
strengthening or mobilising the ability of people, organisations and institutions to implement 
tasks, to solve problems, and to identify and reach objectives.  
 
This type of aid (capacity development) has existed for a long time. By some accounts, it is 
actually how aid started in the early years in the 1950-60s in many developing countries. In 
2011 it was estimated that this type of aid accounted for around US$18 billion, or 13 per cent 
of total global ODA. The IMF today estimates that one-third of its budget and resources go 
towards capacity building. For Norway, the estimate in 2015 was approximately 20 per cent 
of bilateral aid. Exact estimates are hard to come by because this type of aid is included in 
most sectors and programmes, often without being explicitly described as ‘capacity building’ 
or ‘capacity development’ in the aid statistics.   
 
Recommendations from the Platform for Collaboration on Tax in their report ‘Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of External Support in Building Tax Capacity in Developing Countries’ argue for 
the need to focus and strengthen several enablers to build tax capacity (p4).  
 A coherent revenue strategy as part of a development financing plan (national 
development strategy/plan; SDGs strategy/plan; sector development strategy/plan; 
medium term revenue strategy/plan and medium term expenditure frameworks). 
 Strong coordination among well-informed and results-oriented providers (ATI and the 
Platform framework of the IMF, WB, OECD and UN; country level donor groups; 
sector advisory groups; government-led and harmonised strategy under PFM; tax 
policy and tax administration). 
 A strong knowledge and evidence base (there is need to deliver more and better 
applied research on tax policy and administration, both regarding domestic and 
international issues and potential, including overall fiscal incidence, so as to ensure 
that rising tax capacity as much as possible is compatible with the end goal of the 
SDGs, and in particular that of poverty reduction). 
 Strong regional cooperation and support. 
 Strengthened participation of developing countries in international rule setting.  
 
Given the emphasis above on the need for coordination and for basing interventions on 
common analytical and diagnostic assessments, it is striking that the area of tax aid largely 
consists of project type interventions (see Table 2 below) where this is difficult, albeit not 
                                                          
15  See for example WB 2017a, OECD 2017, and IMF 2016. 
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impossible, to achieve. It will be important for donors and partner countries to see to what 
extent they can ensure, in a scaling up of such aid, an improved level of coordination and, 
not least, avoid overlap and interventions with limited efficiency due to a low level of 
ownership. It would also seem a key challenge to scale up efforts on research and core 
support to NGOs working in this field, to ensure that the programming of this aid rests to a 
large extent on applied research, empirical evidence and concerns about power, equity and 
poverty.  
 
Table 2 ODA to DRM by aid type (for 2015) 
  Disbursements Commitments 
Aid type Amount 
(US$ m) 
% Amount 
(US$ m) 
% 
Project-type interventions 120.42 68.99 114.92 63.339 
Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by 
international organisations (multilaterals, INGOs) 
19.16 10.975 21.09 11.623 
Basket funds/pooled funding 13.46 7.711 24.70 13.616 
Donor country personnel 10.97 6.283 10.47 5.773 
Other technical assistance 7.97 4.563 5.70 3.140 
Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, public private 
partnerships and research institutes 
2.22 1.272 4.49 2.474 
Sector budget support 0.29 0.168 N/A  N/A 
Development awareness 0.06 0.035 0.06 0.034 
Administrative costs not included elsewhere 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.001 
Total 174.55   181.44   
Source: OECD 2017  
 
 
5  Towards a basic tax aid framework for 
assessing potential partner developing 
countries  
 
5.1 Conceptual framework for country assessment and ranking 
 
To get a more precise understanding of the need and potential in developing countries for 
increased public resource mobilisation, this paper presents below a mapping of the countries 
classified by the IMF as either low-income countries (LICs) or lower-middle income countries 
(LMICs). This emphasis is due to the SDG financing gap estimates, where it is clear that the 
largest shortfall by far is likely in these countries. This is notwithstanding the fact that there 
could be opportunities in these countries that from a pure cost-benefit perspective are even 
more promising than in richer developing countries. This should however primarily be 
addressed through a differentiated full or partial cost recovery service from private and/or 
public available capacity within a portfolio perspective. Donors could support this at low cost 
without interfering or undermining the overall focus of tax aid.  
 
In total, there were 86 LIC and LMICs in the world in 2015 according to the IMF (IMF 2015). 
To focus further on the countries with the greatest need from an income and poverty 
perspective, countries that have a combination of an income >US$4000 in GNI/CAP/PPP (or 
>US$7000 GNI/CAP/NOM) and a poverty level <10 per cent (1.90 USD/CAP/DAY/PPP) are 
excluded.16 This leaves a smaller group of countries (Somalia and a few small Pacific Island 
State countries are excluded from this group to facilitate analysis and comparability).  
 
                                                          
16  GNI – gross national income; CAP – capita/per capita; PPP – purchasing power parity; NOM – nominal. 
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Countries are then mapped to assess the need and potential for increased efforts to mobilise 
public resources through tax and non-tax sources with significant external tax aid. Different 
sets of indicators are combined to enable assessment: the need for assistance from an 
economic and poverty perspective; from a savings, investment and public expenditure 
perspective; from an external private and public finance perspective; and in terms of current 
and future tax collection potential. By using a wide range of economic indicators,17 a nuanced 
view is reached of each country’s access to finance considering its level of development and 
potential going forward:  
 Gross national income (GNI), poverty (POV) and human development (HDI); 
 Public expenditure (PEXP), investment (INV) and savings (SAVE); 
 Domestic credit (DCREDIT), personal remittances (PREMIT), net aid (NAID) and net 
foreign direct investment (NFDI); 
 Tax capacity/collection (TAX) (here including both tax and non-tax public revenues as 
typically classified); 
 Tax effort non-resource related (TAXEFF-NRT),18 tax aid (TAXAID) and country 
policy and institutional assessment – WB (CPIA). 
 
5.2 Findings from the assessment of LICs and LMICs 
 
Table 3 presents the countries according to their summary ranking, Av 5 = (Av 1 + Av 2 + Av 
3 + Av 4)/4, as well as the underlying ranking of three composite indicators and one singular 
indicator: 
 Av 1 (GNI, POV, HDI) – summing up the average rank in terms of a combination of 
an average of two measures of GNI (gross national income measured as nominal and 
in purchasing power parity per capita), POV (percentage of population with an income 
level below US$1.9/day) and HDI (the score on the human development index).  
 Av 2 (PEXP, INV, SAVE) – summing up the average rank in terms of a combination 
of PEXP (public expenditure as a percentage of GDP), INV (investments as a 
percentage of GDP) and SAVE (savings as a percentage of GDP).  
 Av 3 (DCREDIT, PREMIT, NAID, NFDI) – summing up the average rank in terms of a 
combination of DCREDIT (domestic credit as a percentage of GDP), PREMIT 
(personal remittances as a percentage of GDP), NAID (net aid as a percentage of 
GDP) and NFDI (net foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP).  
 Av 4 (TAX) – tax collection (as a percentage of GDP, with non-tax not included).  
 
The summary indicator Av 5 provides an indication of which countries are the poorest, have 
the lowest access to financing for development (public and private) and the lowest levels of 
public expenditure (financed from both domestic and foreign sources). Table 3 shows a 
domination by SSA countries, which is not surprising given their predominance in the lists of 
LIC and LMICs. Among the top half of countries, there is only one from Latin America 
(Guatemala), six from Asia and the Middle East (Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, 
Cambodia and Bangladesh) and 24 from SSA. In the bottom half of countries, there is higher 
representation from Latin America (Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Guyana) and 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova), 
whereas East Asia and South Asia remain at a similar level as in the top half (Lao PDR, 
India, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Nepal, Timor Leste and Vietnam). Overall, this gives a 
relative predominance of SSA countries, with a share of 77 per cent in the top half and 52 
per cent in the bottom half subcategories of countries.  
 
                                                          
17  See Appendix 1 for explanations of the indicators regarding sources (with web links) and a full list of individual and 
composite indicators utilised in Tables 3 and 4, as well as in Appendix 2.  
18  In the rest of this paper, this is referred to simply as ‘TAXEFF’ for short, but the data utilised is specifically referring to 
the non-resource related part. See footnote 20 and Brun and Diakite 2016 for more information.  
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An overall observation regarding Table 3 regards significant variation in ranking between the 
different composite indicators; this occurs both between regions and within regions. Many 
Asian and European countries, for example, have significantly lower rates of poverty at 
similar levels of income than many African countries. There are however also significant 
differences between countries at similar income levels concerning their levels of savings, 
investment and expenditures, as well as foreign financing and investment. Differences in 
both governance and resource endowment, possibly related to non-renewables in particular, 
could be among the explanatory factors. Within the group of African countries there are also 
large divergences. One example is Zambia and Cote D’Ivoire: although they have similar 
income levels, the latter country has half the poverty rate of the former.  
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Table 3 Ranking of LIC and LMICs by Av 519 
 
                                                          
19  As well as their ranks by Av 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
Av 1 (GNI, POV, HDI) Av 2 (PEXP, INV, SAVE) Av 3 (DCREDIT, PREMIT, NAID, NFDI) Av 4 (Tax) Av 5 (1-4)
1 South Sudan 17.8 3.5 11.75 2 8.76
2 Guinea Bissau 8.25 3 23.75 7 10.50
3 CAR 2.75 8 23.75 10 11.13
4 Yemen 27 3.5 15 6 12.88
5 DRC 5.75 13.5 22.75 15 14.25
6 Eritrea 16.3 4 25.75 15 15.26
7 Madagascar 11 17.5 22.75 12 15.81
8 Burundi 3.75 5.5 26.75 28 16.00
9 Sierra Leone 11 15.5 30.5 11 17.00
10 Chad 17.5 40 10 3 17.63
11 Nigeria 33.5 22 14.25 1 17.69
12 Malaw i 7.75 9.5 27.25 27 17.88
13 Sudan 42 21 14.25 4 20.31
13 Guinea 11 8 27.25 35 20.31
14 Rw anda 17 22 22.75 24 21.44
15 Mali 17 22 26 26 22.75
16 Burkina Faso 14 15 23.5 40 23.13
17 Uganda 21 37 22.5 13 23.38
18 Pakistan 39 18 22.25 15 23.56
19 Cameroon 31 30 10.5 23 23.63
20 Afghanistan 19 39 23 14 23.75
21 Myanmar 42 32 17.75 5 24.19
22 Niger 6.8 49 27.5 17 25.08
23 Cote D'Ivoire 28 24 17.75 31 25.19
24 Tanzania 25 42 21 16 26.00
25 Guatemala 48 15 25.25 19 26.81
26 Congo Rep 42 40 17 9 27.00
27 Benin 19 35 22.75 32 27.19
28 Cambodia 37 22 30.25 20 27.31
29 Comoros 18 22 31.25 39 27.56
30 Bangladesh 34 44 25.75 8 27.94
31 Ethiopia 18 50 27 21 29.00
32 Gambia 21 20 38.5 37 29.13
33 Angola 41 19 14.75 44 29.69
34 Kenya 31 24 23.25 41 29.81
35 Lao PDR 40 33 20.5 29 30.63
36 Haiti 21 44 34.5 25 31.13
37 Liberia 8.8 15 47.5 54 31.33
38 Togo 14 30 36.5 46 31.63
39 Tajikistan 42 18 25 45 32.50
40 Lesotho 24 24 26 58 33.00
41 Zimbabw e 30 12 34.25 57 33.31
42 Honduras 42 31 26.75 34 33.44
43 Mozambique 8.3 40 35.25 52 33.89
44 India 43 52 23 18 34.00
45 Ghana 37 37 29.25 36 34.81
46 Senegal 23 36 31.75 50 35.19
47 PNG 37 48 14.5 43 35.63
47 Zambia 29 52 19.5 42 35.63
48 Mauritania 41 52 28.25 22 35.81
49 Nepal 28 55 31.5 30 36.13
50 Sao TP 35 41 37 33 36.50
51 Guyana 53 15 36.75 51 38.94
52 Uzbekistan 41 50 16.5 49 39.13
53 Djibouti 32 36 34.75 55 39.44
54 Nicaragua 46 41 36.25 36 39.81
55 Timor Leste 37 39 27.25 59 40.56
56 Bolivia 50 34 27 53 41.00
57 Vietnam 49 47 32 38 41.50
58 Kyrgz Rep 42 46 33.5 48 42.38
59 Moldova 50 31 35.5 56 43.13
60 Cabo Verde 50 52 44 47 48.25
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In Table 4, the countries are presented in their order of overall rank result for a chosen sum 
of singular and composite indicators (see Appendix 1 for further details): Av 9 = (Av 1 + Av 2 
+ Av 3 + Av 4 + Av 6 + Av 7 + Av 8)/720 as well as for three singular indicators:  
 Av 6 (TAXEFF) – an estimate of the effort made in a country to collect tax revenue 
(tax/GDP) as compared to other countries, when adjusting for different key factors 
that affect the ability to pay taxes, such as income level, the structure of the economy, 
urbanisation and governance. Measured from 0-100, with a higher number indicating 
a higher effort.  
 Av 7 (TAXAID) – measures the estimated total tax aid (in current US$) disbursed to 
the developing country from donor countries.  
 Av 8 (CPIA) – a summary rating carried out by the WB of the political and institutional 
quality in a given country, utilising a variety of available sources and expert 
assessments. Utilised by WB in aid allocation decisions between countries.  
 
The resulting rank should be used with some caution due to the sensitivity of the indicators 
chosen, somewhat varying quality of data, and whether the overall direct and indirect weight 
of each indicator is the most appropriate for the purpose. In most cases, it may also need to 
be complemented by other filters and indicators to identify the countries where the need and 
potential related to tax aid is the highest.  
 
Table 4 shows a similar predominance of SSA countries in the top half of countries (27) as in 
Table 3. There is only one country from Latin America (Honduras, up from 42nd to 21st rank 
compared to Table 3), six from East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East (Yemen, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Myanmar, Cambodia and Bangladesh) and 20 from SSA. In the bottom half (27) 
there is again a higher relative representation of Latin America (Nicaragua, Bolivia and 
Guyana), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova), and 
East Asia and South Asia (India, PNG, Nepal, Timor Leste and Vietnam). This gives a 
representation of 74 per cent and 59 per cent from SSA in the top and bottom half of 
countries in Table 4.  
 
Looking at the variations between Tables 3 and 4 in terms of the overall ranking shown by Av 
5 and Av 9 respectively, there are some major changes up and down the list. Among the top 
15 countries in Table 4, 11 countries are the same. The largest relative change is the 
Republic of the Congo that moves up from 26th rank in Table 3 to 9th in Table 4. The other 
‘newcomers’ among the top 15 sub group is Cameroon (up from 19th to 12th rank), 
Afghanistan (up from 20th to 13th rank) and Pakistan (up from 18th to 14th rank). Among 
countries that were in the top 15 sub group in Table 3, Malawi and Burundi have the largest 
relative drop, respectively down from 12th to 26th rank and 8th to 27th rank. Both are countries 
with relatively low levels of income and high poverty and low levels of savings, but in relative 
terms they have a high tax effort, tax aid and a low governance rating, contributing to their 
deteriorating rank in Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
20  A note regarding Av 6 is that it represents an estimate: an average has been calculated based on data from Brun and 
Diakite 2016, combining two different methods of tax effort focusing on the non-resource tax revenue. It would be 
preferable to use a tax effort estimate for the entire economy; however, the countries included in earlier studies (see for 
example Fenocchieto and Pessino 2013 and Minh Le, Moreno-Dodson and Bayraktar 2012) leave out several countries 
which are included here. Regarding the data on tax aid, please refer to the discussion on pages 14-15 above regarding 
completeness.  
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Table 4 Ranking of LIC and LMICs by Av 921 
 
                                                          
21  As well as their ranks by Av 6, 7 and 8. 
Av 6 (TAXEFF-NRT) Av 7 (TAXAID) Av 8 (CPIA) Av 9 (1-4 and 6-8)
1 Guinea Bissau 4 5 39 12.86
2 Chad 5 16 2 13.36
3 Nigeria 3 1 20 13.54
4 Yemen 6 13 30 14.36
5 South Sudan 43 18 7 14.72
6 Sierra Leone 23 7 12 15.71
7 Madagascar 17 9 23 16.04
8 CAR 20 8 40 16.07
9 Congo Rep 8 1 3 17.14
10 Guinea 10 1 29 17.32
11 DRC 11 20 36 17.71
12 Cameroon 12 4 18 18.36
13 Afghanistan 2 22 15 19.14
14 Pakistan 13 1 26 19.18
15 Eritrea 40 19 25 20.72
16 Niger 18 12 17 21.04
17 Burkina Faso 27 29 1 21.36
18 Rw anda 29 31 7 21.82
19 Cote D'Ivoire 44 2 6 21.82
19 Bangladesh 7 36 8 23.25
20 Uganda 22 33 16 23.50
21 Honduras 19 6 6 23.54
22 Sudan 51 1 35 24.04
22 Cambodia 9 28 22 24.04
23 Myanmar 14 41 19 24.39
24 Tanzania 31 34 2 24.43
25 Mali 35 10 38 24.86
26 Malaw i 50 26 28 25.07
27 Burundi 53 27 33 25.29
28 Ethiopia 38 21 9 26.29
29 Comoros 25 14 37 26.61
30 Ghana 24 2 22 26.75
31 Gambia 30 3 38 26.79
32 Uzbekistan 21 1 11 27.07
33 Benin 32 25 33 28.39
34 India 39 2 22 28.43
35 Togo 45 1 32 29.21
36 Timor Leste 1 11 31 29.32
37 Nepal 16 8 41 29.93
38 Bolivia 33 1 13 30.14
39 Mauritania 37 1 35 30.89
40 Kenya 47 35 17 31.18
41 Vietnam 26 23 5 31.43
42 Lesotho 54 1 34 31.57
43 Senegal 36 40 5 31.68
44 Guyana 48 1 20 32.11
45 Moldova 49 1 4 32.36
46 Djibouti 42 17 14 32.96
47 Mozambique 34 39 24 33.22
48 Nicaragua 41 30 4 33.46
49 PNG 52 15 27 33.79
50 Zambia 46 32 20 34.36
51 Cabo Verde 28 24 11 36.57
52 Kyrgz Rep 55 38 21 40.50
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From a development policy and current partner country perspective, how does the above 
ranking of countries to prioritise for tax aid look? As a small illustration, countries are 
matched with the official current list of partner countries as identified in the recent Norwegian 
White Paper on the SDGs and aid (May 2017). There are four categories of countries to 
which Norway provides aid, with the first three categories receiving larger amounts of 
assistance. Each of the categories comprises eight countries and targets types of countries 
that have somewhat different characteristics: long-term strategic partnership countries; 
stabilisation and conflict prevention countries; and global challenge countries. The fourth 
category includes a longer list of cooperating partner countries with more limited 
programming and partnerships.  
 
Matching the results from Table 4 with the priority countries for Norwegian development aid 
gives the results presented in Table 5 by category of collaborating countries. It is clear that 
with current general geographical and country priorities, there are some developing countries 
with both a high need and potential that fall outside this list. Judging from the OECD tax aid 
statistics (see ATI 2017), although these are somewhat lacking in coverage, there are today 
a number of countries that currently do not receive significant tax aid from Norway or other 
donors that could be considered. These include, for example, individual countries such as 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Nepal and South Sudan, as well as broader sub 
categories such as Sahel (Niger, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Cameroon) and Central 
African countries (Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of the Congo and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Many of these are fragile states albeit with 
different characteristics. Not included below are a number of Pacific small island states that 
are also on the low end of receiving tax aid.   
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Table 5 Categorisation of developing countries according to Norwegian aid policy22 
 
 
6  Towards a strategic approach in tax aid  
6.1 Financing for development and tax 
 
There is little doubt that tax and public revenue is positively associated with state building, 
economic growth and development over time. There is a strong case both theoretically and 
empirically for the governance and development dividend of tax as put forward by Moore 
(2008). It is also clear that the optimal level of tax collection and size of the public sector 
have changed a lot over time, as Lindert (2004) has shown in the context of the US and 
                                                          
22  The four categories of partner countries used in this table represent the current policy of Norway as reflected in the 
white paper from May 2017 as well as in Appendix 1 of the official budget proposition to parliament for 2017-18. The text 
in column 5 explains the main intention in terms of the type of collaboration and justification. In general, CAT 1-3 include 
the countries that receive the highest bilateral aid from Norway, and where Norway typically is present with several 
projects and types of development assistance. Note that the concept of partner countries is currently under review and 
will be treated in a forthcoming white paper in 2018. This may introduce changes. The final column in the table shows 
whether Norway has an embassy, an embassy section or no direct diplomatic representation in the country in question.  
Rank across Norwegian Partner Country categories
Uganda rank 20 CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership Embassy
Myanmar rank 23 CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership Embassy
Tanzania rank 24 CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership Embassy
Malawi rank 26 CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership Embassy
Ethiopia rank 28 CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership Embassy
Nepal rank 37 CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership Embassy
Mozambique rank 47 CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership Embassy
South Sudan rank 5 CAT 2 Partner country Stabilisation and conflict prevention Embassy
Afghanistan rank 13 CAT 2 Partner country Stabilisation and conflict prevention
Mali rank 25 CAT 2 Partner country Stabilisation and conflict prevention Embassy
Nigeria rank 3 CAT 3 Partner country Global challenges Embassy
Yemen rank 4 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Sierra Leone rank 6 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Madagascar rank 7 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy  section
CAR rank 8 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Congo Rep rank 9 CAT 4 Cooperating country
DRC rank 11 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy  section
Cameroon rank 12 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Afghanistan rank 13 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Pakistan rank 14 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Eritrea rank 15 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Niger rank 16 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Burkina Faso rank 17 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Rwanda rank 18 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Cote D'Ivoire rank 19 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Bangladesh rank 19 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Honduras rank 21 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Sudan rank 22 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Cambodia rank 22 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Burundi rank 27 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Ghana rank 30 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
India rank 34 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Timor Leste rank 36 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Bolivia rank 38 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Kenya rank 40 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Vietnam rank 41 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Guyana rank 44 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Moldova rank 45 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Mozambique rank 47 CAT 4 Cooperating country Embassy
Nicaragua rank 48 CAT 4 Cooperating country
PNG rank 49 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Zambia rank 50 CAT 4 Cooperating country
Liberia rank 37 (Av 5) CAT 1 Partner country Longterm strategic partnership
Haiti rank 36 (Av 5) CAT 2 Partner country Stabilisation and conflict prevention
Somalia No data CAT 2 Partner country Stabilisation and conflict prevention
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Europe. A similar observation applies for the followers and latecomers in achieving modern 
economic development.  
 
Current developing countries seem to have an unprecedented opportunity to achieve 
development both faster and at a lower cost per unit. For many developing countries, this will 
require an intensification of domestic revenue mobilisation and improving tax systems, 
together with linkages to service delivery and development for the majority. Success will 
depend on growing the economy and securing both private and public finance for 
development expenditure. This paper has focused on the task of and potential for raising 
public revenue mainly through taxation. Fortunately, on average the trend for developing 
countries is positive in recent decades.  
 
6.2 Partner country assessments in tax aid 
 
The scaling up of domestic resource mobilisation to 2020 and beyond provides an 
opportunity to think more systematically about how to allocate larger funding for tax aid both 
geographically and thematically. For most donor countries and their agencies, this will 
involve considering a range of criteria. This paper has emphasised one framework with a set 
of associated criteria that assesses the needs and the potential of developing countries to 
mobilise domestic public resources for public expenditures. Obviously, there are a number of 
alternative approaches and criteria and in reality, many donors may be driven more by 
political realities and priorities combined with path dependency and established country 
partnerships, as well as by indications of who is ready to work on revenue reforms among 
developing countries (and who communicates this actively to the donor community). A 
related major consideration is absorptive capacity in the partner country in general, 
considering that so far, the majority of tax aid has been delivered through relatively stand-
alone project type interventions (see Table 2). Another different but related agenda is the 
national versus regional and international agenda and reforms in the area of public revenue 
and tax systems.  
 
What has this paper found through utilising the chosen assessment framework for potential 
partner countries in the field of tax aid? A first observation was related to a question of 
whether there was any difference between a ranking of countries based on income, poverty 
and human development (Av 1) and a ranking of countries based on the aggregate of all the 
indicators (Av 9). Significant changes were in fact found for most countries except a very few 
such as Tanzania, Timor Leste, Mauritania, Uganda and Nicaragua. The average change in 
rank was -80 per cent, meaning that change is most dominant downwards for countries. Note 
that some of this was dominated by large shifts seen by a few countries such as Burundi, 
CAR, Mozambique, Malawi, Togo and DRC. The largest upward shift in rank happened for 
countries such as Nigeria, Chad, Yemen, Guinea Bissau, the Republic of the Congo, South 
Sudan, Pakistan and Cameroon. It seems obvious that for this last sub group there were 
strong political, institutional and security explanations for the low level of both tax collection 
and effort on average.   
 
Similarly, there are also changes between the summary indicator in Table 3 (Av 5) to Table 4 
(Av 9). The largest relative change upwards in rank is the Republic of the Congo (moving up 
from 26th to 9th rank), whereas other newcomers in the top 15 group of countries include 
Cameroon (up from 19th to 12th rank), Afghanistan (up from 20th to 13th rank) and Pakistan 
(up from 18th to 14th rank). Two countries that fall out of the top 15 country sub group are 
Burundi (down from 8th to 27th rank) and Malawi (down from 12th to 26th rank).  
 
The analysis in Table 4 shows a predominance of SSA countries in the list when considering 
both the needs and potential for tax-related aid using the identified indicators. It also confirms 
that there is a significant group of aid orphan countries when it comes to tax aid. Among the 
top half of countries (27) there is only one from Latin America (Honduras, up from 42nd to 21st 
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rank),23 six from East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East (Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Myanmar, Cambodia and Bangladesh) and 20 from SSA. The distribution between the upper 
and lower half of the table (27 countries in each sub category) is 74 per cent and 59 per cent 
from SSA respectively.  
 
6.3 The focus of tax aid and trade offs 
 
Moving from the overall ranking of developing countries by need and potential for tax aid, a 
natural next step is to assess to what extent emphasis should be on tax policy and/or 
administration (compliance). Brun and Diakite (2016) provide a first indication of this related 
to tax effort estimates, whereas Keen and Slemrod (2017) provide a theoretical basis and 
indicative empirical perspective on how to estimate this related to tax gap calculations. In the 
first contribution, the authors disentangle overall tax effort into tax policy effectiveness and 
tax administrative efficiency.  
 
An overall finding, widely reflected in the literature (see Ananou and Houngbonon 2015) is 
that resource rich countries tend to have lower tax efforts. Regarding the policy-
administration duality of tax, Ananou and Houngbonon find that overall, inefficiencies and low 
tax capacity/collection are related more to poor tax policy (statutory and incentive-
exemptions in tax conditions, adapted through investment, trade and tax treaties, economic 
zones, contracts and agreements) than to tax administrative performance. There are 
however significant variations between countries, emphasising again the need for country 
specific analysis and scoping work.  
 
This paper has not gone further into a detailed empirical or country comparative discussion 
of trying to identify to what extent need and potential is to be found in policy or administration 
(compliance); in resource (non-renewable and renewable) sectors or non-resource sectors; 
urban or rural areas (informal and formal); nor the fundamental impact of design and 
implementation of a public revenue strategy.  
 
Furthermore, as has been evidenced increasingly in recent literature, there is a need to 
assess the impact of tax on a wide range of indicators such as savings, investment, growth, 
poverty, and the equity of different fiscal policy (revenue and expenditure-related) choices. 
There will continue to be trade-offs and countervailing forces that need to be more carefully 
considered in country analysis to raise public resources that more effectively promote 
development.  
 
6.4 Tax in development strategies and remaining selection and design 
challenges 
 
When the potential in the area of tax policy and administration has been established through 
different available studies, diagnostics and country assessments, there is a need to get more 
specific in terms of thematic focus and delivery modality. Linked to this is also a requirement 
to put increased emphasis on longer term national level planning and strategic frameworks 
for public revenue mobilisation in developing countries. The IMF, together with its PCT 
partners in DRM and capacity building in the area of tax, has been developing a Medium-
Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS) approach. This could provide an appropriate longer term 
government framework integrating all relevant aggregate actions and targets related to 
domestic revenue mobilisation. This may prove effective, especially if made operational with 
developing country governments taking the lead, and clear links to: national development 
plans and strategies; medium term expenditure frameworks; revenue authorities’ corporate 
plans, public financial management plans and annual budgets. This would also provide an 
                                                          
23  Note that Guatemala would have been likely to be included in this group of countries, but this comparison was not 
possible due to lack of data for the scoring of several indicators needed to construct comparables for Av 9.  
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opportunity for donor coordination under one comprehensive framework with clear roles and 
responsibilities over a multi-year period.  
 
Both diagnostic tools (principally the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool 
(TADAT) developed by the IMF) and overall comparative data (through the global databases 
administered by the IMF – first through RA-FIT and today through ISORA) are currently 
mainly available to assess the quality of  tax administration (although elements such as 
customs, specialised areas such as extractives, and human resources are currently not 
covered). For tax policy there is a much less developed diagnostic tool, as well as difficulties 
in assembling and using comparative data for different countries. The WB is currently 
developing a tax policy assessment tool (TPAT) in partnership with the IMF, and there are of 
course global databases with some comparative policy data. Overall, the Public Expenditure 
and Financial Assessment (PEFA) diagnostic (hosted by the WB), as well as a number of 
other internal IMF/WB and other organisational tools, are being used by a number of 
agencies and partners to shed some light on policy quality.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the countries with the largest relative development needs and potential 
for improved tax systems are identified, challenges remain relating to what is realistic from a 
more specific political economy perspective, including potential partner institutions and 
effective forms of collaboration. To these could also be added the already mentioned 
importance of looking into the inequality and poverty effects of tax and redistribution efforts at 
the country level as seen through service delivery and public expenditure (Lustig 2017). 
Clearly, some countries perform significantly better here than others, but this element has not 
been included in this ranking exercise, and this paper does not provide any of the emerging 
empirical evidence forthcoming on this area as the coverage is still limited.  
 
For most donors, as for most development aid today, a comprehensive framework where 
alternative aid interventions are systematically assessed against each other does not exist. 
This is despite efforts to carry out indicative needs assessments and planning at global, 
regional and country levels. Instead, a more practical approach at the country level might 
often possibly be aimed for, trying to assess where to find the ‘dangling fruits’ as Moore and 
Prichard (2017) call them with respect to opportunities to increase DRM in the developing 
world. Based on different characteristics of both contributing and receiving partner countries, 
there may however also be certain options and choices that stand out. To what extent the 
alternatives can be assessed through a cost-benefit lens or alternative choice methodology is 
still relatively uncharted territory except perhaps at the project level in country (e.g. some 
projects carried out by the UK Department for International Development (DFID).  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Explanation of indicators: abbreviations, source (including definitions) 
and ranking 
 
Indicators 
 
The indicators utilised in the tables in Appendix 2 (and in aggregated sub indicators in tables 
3 and 4) to rank developing countries in terms of need of and potential for tax aid are:  
 
Indicator Source (including definition in link) Year 
Av 1 (GNI+POV+HDI)   
GNI/NOM/CAP (in US$) 
(gross national income/nominal/per 
capita) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 
 
Latest available year 
(mostly 2015 or 
2016) 
GNI/PPP/CAP (in US$) 
(purchasing power parity) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD 
 
Latest available year 
(mostly 2015 or 
2016) 
POV 
(% of population <1.90 US$/day) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY 
 
Latest available year 
(mostly 2015 or 
2016) 
HDI  
(score on the human development 
index) 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
 
Latest available year 
(mostly 2015 or 
2016) 
Av 2 (PEXP+INV+SAVE)   
PEXP (as % of GDP) 
(public expenditure) 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.
aspx 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
INV (as % of GDP) 
(investment) 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.
aspx 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
SAVE (as % of GDP) 
(savings) 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.
aspx 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
 Av 3 
(TAX+DCREDIT+NAID+PREMIT+NFDI) 
  
TAX (as % of GDP) 
(tax capacity/collection) 
www.wider.unu.edu/project/government-revenue-dataset 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
DCREDIT (as % of GDP) 
(domestic credit) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
NAID (as % of GDP) 
(Net aid) 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.
aspx 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
PREMIT (as % of GDP) 
(personal remittances) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD
.ZS 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
NFDI (as % of GDP) 
(net foreign direct investment) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.
ZS 
 
Annual average of 
2010-2015 (or 
earlier years if later 
years not available) 
Av 4 (TAX) See above See above 
Av 5 (Av 1 + Av 2 + Av 3 + Av 4) An average of the ranking of the four by country See above 
Av 6 (TAXEFF) (from 0-100) 
(tax effort) 
http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2016/2016.10.pdf 
 
For 2010 (or latest 
available data) 
Av 7 (TAXAID) (in US$) 
(total tax aid disbursed from donor 
countries to a developing country) 
 www.addistaxinitiative.net/documents/Addis-Tax-
Initiative_Monitoring-Report_2015_EN.pdf 
For 2015 
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Av 8 (CPIA) (summary indicator) 
(country policy and institutional 
assessment – World Bank) 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia 
 
For 2015 (or latest 
available data) 
Av 9 (Av 5 + Av 6 + Av 7 + Av 8) An average of the ranking of the four by country See above 
 
Some countries were removed from the tables as the assessment evolved due to either a 
lack of data and/or, in the case of some countries in the Pacific, being very small (these were 
considered to require a different and possibly sub regional approach). In tables 3 and 4, the 
number of countries as a result dropped to 62 and 54 respectively.  
 
Countries are mapped and sorted through a series of tables which present the results of a 
simple ranking exercise without any attempt at weighting or differentiating. This is directly 
influenced however through using a mix of composite and singular indicator ranking.  
 
The singular indicators are (see the table above for details regarding definition, source and 
year): 
 Av 4 (TAX) 
 Av 6 (TAXEFF) 
 Av 7 (TAXAID)  
 Av 8 (CPIA) 
 
The composite indicators are (see the table above for details regarding definition, source and 
year): 
 Av 1 (GNI+POV+HDI) 
 Av 2 (PEXP+INV+SAVE) 
 Av 3 (TAX+DCREDIT+NAID+PREMIT+NFDI) 
 
Changes to this method or adding up of ranks by indicator can evidently influence the end 
mapping result. Countries are ranked from first to last based on their relative performance. 
For all but one of the indicators, the highest rank is given to the country with the poorest 
performance (the only exception is for the CPIA, where the best performance is given the 
highest rating, to include the composite political and institutional aspect). This is not 
necessarily always a conceptually nor theoretically obvious correct basis for ranking 
countries, as you may have countries with, for example, a higher rate of tax collection (Av 4), 
that in reality have an even higher potential to increase their level of collection. To some 
extent, this possible distortion is removed through using a variety of indicators whereby 
together they may provide a comprehensive rank that provides a relative idea of the need 
and potential for development assistance in the area of public revenue and tax in particular. 
Removing this distortion altogether is however impossible in such an approach.  
 
This is also why complementary and/or secondary or more layers and/or filters are required 
to check the validity of the ranking and sorting of possible partner countries. As indicated 
earlier in the paper, there are similarly fundamental issues related to government ownership 
of revenue reforms and absorptive capacity. Ideally, an assessment like this should also look 
into a country’s record of accomplishment or consider the potential elasticity of increases in 
tax collection related to, for example, the levels of public expenditure, public service delivery, 
growth and poverty. From this, an informed opinion/assessment must also be shaped on the 
donor side with regards to what is likely for the coming years in order for a commitment to be 
made regarding tax aid allocation, design and follow up.  
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Appendix 2 Detailed country tables  
 
 
GNI/NOM/CAP GNI/PPP/CAP POV HDI Av 1
CAR 320 2 620 1 66 7 0.20 1 2.75
Burundi 260 1 730 3 74 3 0.28 8 3.75
DRC 410 6 720 2 77 2 0.30 13 5.75
Niger 390 5 950 4 46 15 0.25 3 6.75
Malaw i 350 3 1140 6 71 4 0.33 18 7.75
Mozambique 580 12 1170 7 69 5 0.28 9 8.25
Guinea Bissau 590 13 1450 10 67 6 0.26 4 8.25
Liberia 380 4 720 2 39 19 0.28 10 8.75
Madagascar 420 7 1410 9 78 1 0.37 27 11
Sierra Leone 630 14 1560 13 52 12 0.26 5 11
Guinea 470 9 1120 5 35 23 0.27 7 11
Togo 540 11 1330 8 49 14 0.33 21 13.5
Burkina Faso 660 15 1660 17 44 17 0.27 6 13.75
Eritrea 520 10 1500 12 63 8 0.42 35 16.25
Rw anda 700 17 1720 19 60 9 0.34 23 17
Mali 790 19 1970 23 49 14 0.29 11 16.75
Chad 880 23 2110 25 38 20 0.24 2 17.5
South Sudan 790 19 1630 15 43 18 0.33 19 17.75
Benin 860 22 2050 24 50 13 0.30 15 18.5
Ethiopia 590 13 1620 14 34 25 0.33 19 17.75
Afghanistan 630 14 1940 22 36 22 0.33 17 18.75
Comoros 790 19 1490 11 18 34 0.27 7 17.75
Gambia 450 8 1640 16 45 16 0.45 42 20.5
Haiti 820 20 1760 20 25 29 0.30 14 20.75
Uganda 670 16 1820 21 35 24 0.34 24 21.25
Lesotho 1280 34 3290 36 60 9 0.32 16 23.75
Senegal 1000 25 2380 27 38 20 0.33 20 23
Tanzania 910 24 2630 29 49 14 0.40 31 24.5
Yemen 1140 28 2720 31 19 33 0.32 16 27
Cote D'Ivoire 1420 37 3260 35 29 28 0.29 12 28
Zambia 1490 40 3640 41 58 10 0.37 26 29.25
Nepal 730 18 2500 28 15 35 0.41 32 28.25
Zimbabw e 850 21 1710 18 21 32 0.48 48 29.75
Kenya 1340 36 3070 32 34 25 0.39 29 30.5
Cameroon 1320 35 3070 33 24 30 0.35 25 30.75
Nigeria 2790 52 5810 53 54 11 0.33 18 33.5
Djibouti 1030 26 2200 26 23 31 0.47 45 32
Bangladesh 1140 29 3560 40 19 33 0.41 33 33.75
Sao TP 1760 43 3250 34 32 26 0.43 37 35
Timor Leste 2290 50 4550 45 44 17 0.42 34 36.5
PNG 2160 47 2700 30 38 20 0.52 50 36.75
Cambodia 1070 27 3300 37 3 44 0.44 38 36.5
Ghana 1480 39 4080 44 14 36 0.39 30 37.25
Uzbekistan 2160 47 6200 55 67 6 0.59 56 41
Lao PDR 1740 42 5400 50 23 31 0.43 36 39.75
Pakistan 1440 38 5320 49 6 41 0.38 28 39
Angola 4180 57 6470 58 30 27 0.34 22 41
Congo Rep 2540 51 6320 56 37 21 0.45 40 42
Mauritania 1230 32 3690 42 6 41 0.51 49 41
Sudan 1920 44 3990 43 15 35 0.46 44 41.5
Honduras 2280 49 4750 46 18 34 0.44 39 42
India 1590 41 6030 54 21 32 0.45 43 42.5
Tajikistan 1240 33 3460 39 5 42 0.53 53 41.75
Kyrgz Rep 1170 31 3310 38 3 44 0.58 55 42
Myanmar 1160 30 4930 47 7 39 0.53 52 42
Nicaragua 1940 45 5060 48 4 43 0.48 47 45.75
Guatemala 3590 55 7530 60 10 37 0.45 41 48.25
Vietnam 1990 46 5720 52 3 44 0.56 54 49
Bolivia 3000 53 6710 59 7 40 0.48 46 49.5
Cabo Verde 3280 54 6320 57 8 38 0.52 51 50
Moldova 2240 48 5400 51 0 45 0.63 57 50.25
Guyana 4120 56 7580 61 14 36 0.64 58 52.75
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PEXP INV SAVE Av 2
CAR 15.1 6 12.5 7 5 9 8
Burundi 33.4 43 13.6 9 -3.7 2 5.5
DRC 13.9 3 14.9 11 11.1 16 13.5
Niger 25.7 26 42.1 53 24.2 45 49
Malaw i 30.5 38 13.6 9 5.6 10 9.5
Mozambique 33.7 46 48.2 55 13.9 24 39.5
Guinea Bissau 18.4 9 7.9 2 3.2 4 3
Liberia 33.6 45 8.8 4 15.3 25 14.5
Madagascar 14.7 5 16.9 17 12.1 18 17.5
Sierra Leone 19 10 22.7 28 -3.4 3 15.5
Guinea 25.6 25 15 12 -3.3 4 8
Togo 27.3 31 25.1 32 15.7 28 30
Burkina Faso 24.1 21 16.3 15 9.8 14 14.5
Eritrea 30.6 39 8.6 3 1.5 5 4
Rw anda 26.5 29 25.2 33 7.7 11 22
Mali 20.4 14 19 23 13.1 21 22
Chad 21 17 28.5 40 19.8 40 40
South Sudan 39.4 52 10.7 6 -5.2 1 3.5
Benin 20.7 16 25.3 34 17.5 35 34.5
Ethiopia 17.8 8 35 48 30.1 52 50
Afghanistan 24.5 23 22.9 29 28.3 48 38.5
Comoros 25.2 24 17.9 21 13.4 22 21.5
Gambia 27.8 33 21.1 26 9.3 13 19.5
Haiti 24.2 22 29.3 42 25.1 46 44
Uganda 17.3 7 26.9 36 19.4 37 36.5
Lesotho 51.6 55 9.3 5 21.2 43 24
Senegal 29 36 25.8 35 17.7 36 35.5
Tanzania 19.1 11 29.3 42 20.6 42 42
Yemen 29 36 6.4 1 3 6 3.5
Cote D'Ivoire 21.5 18 16.2 14 17.3 33 23.5
Zambia 22.9 19 34.9 47 36.4 57 52
Nepal 19.4 13 37.4 51 40.4 58 54.5
Zimbabw e 28.6 35 16.7 16 4.2 8 12
Kenya 25.7 27 21.1 26 13.4 22 24
Cameroon 20.6 15 21.1 26 17.4 34 30
Nigeria 13.6 2 15.3 13 16.9 31 22
Djibouti 42.2 54 34.8 46 15.4 26 36
Bangladesh 13.9 3 28.3 38 29.5 50 44
Sao TP 39.4 53 35.4 50 17 32 41
Timor Leste 31.1 41 17.4 19 59 59 39
PNG 23.1 20 28.4 39 33.6 56 47.5
Cambodia 20.6 15 22.1 27 11.9 17 22
Ghana 27.3 31 27 37 17.7 36 36.5
Uzbekistan 33.5 44 30.8 44 33.5 55 49.5
Lao PDR 26.1 28 28.3 38 15.65 27 32.5
Pakistan 20.4 14 15 12 13.8 23 17.5
Angola 36.9 47 12.9 8 16.2 29 18.5
Congo Rep 38.6 50 28.3 38 19.9 41 39.5
Mauritania 26.9 30 46.9 54 29.2 49 51.5
Sudan 14.6 4 18.1 22 12.2 19 20.5
Honduras 27.7 32 23.5 31 16.6 30 30.5
India 27.3 31 35.3 49 32.9 54 51.5
Tajikistan 28.3 34 17.6 20 10.8 15 17.5
Kyrgz Rep 37.9 48 30.9 45 25.3 47 46
Myanmar 19.3 12 20.4 25 19.5 38 31.5
Nicaragua 24.5 23 29.4 43 19.7 39 41
Guatemala 13.5 1 13.9 10 12.3 20 15
Vietnam 29.3 37 28.6 41 31.1 53 47
Bolivia 38.3 49 19.2 24 21.3 44 34
Cabo Verde 33.2 42 39.4 52 29.8 51 51.5
Moldova 39 51 23.4 30 16.9 31 30.5
Guyana 30.8 40 17 18 8.5 12 15
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TAX DCREDIT NAID PREMIT NFDI Av 3
CAR 9.45 10 29.7 32 19.2 51 0.012 3 1.4 9 21.00
Burundi 13.58 28 25.1 27 21 53 1.8 17 1.5 10 26.67
DRC 10 15 7 3 13.1 44 0.1 5 8.3 39 29.33
Niger 10.82 17 13.3 6 11.8 41 2.1 19 11.6 44 34.67
Malaw i 13.56 27 21.4 19 16.4 50 0.5 9 6.3 31 30.00
Mozambique 20.36 52 30.2 33 14.9 47 1.1 13 29.4 48 36.00
Guinea Bissau 7.95 7 16.7 13 10.6 39 5.5 29 2.1 14 27.33
Liberia 20.86 54 35.1 39 59.8 55 22 47 44.1 49 50.33
Madagascar 9.77 12 14.8 9 5.3 22 4.5 27 6.5 33 27.33
Sierra Leone 9.51 11 15.3 11 15.6 49 1.6 16 14.9 46 37.00
Guinea 14.8 35 29.7 32 7.8 33 1.3 14 6 30 25.67
Togo 16.6 46 38.4 42 9.4 36 9 36 6.4 32 34.67
Burkina Faso 15.63 40 23.1 21 9.8 37 2.4 21 2.2 15 24.33
Eritrea 10 15 104.5 57 6.5 27 0.5 9 1.5 10 15.33
Rw anda 12.6 24 13.3 6 15.2 48 2 18 2.6 19 28.33
Mali 12.99 26 18.8 16 9.9 38 6.3 31 2.6 19 29.33
Chad 5.37 3 9.2 4 4.2 15 0.06 4 2.4 17 12.00
South Sudan 1.7 2 12 5 10.8 40 0 1 -1.3 1 14.00
Benin 14.41 32 20 17 7.3 32 2.5 22 2.7 20 24.67
Ethiopia 11.47 21 43.4 46 8.3 34 1.3 14 2.1 14 20.67
Afghanistan 9.8 14 20.9 18 30.2 54 1.5 15 0.4 5 24.67
Comoros 15.5 39 24.4 25 12.6 43 19.2 46 1.6 11 33.33
Gambia 15.1 37 38.3 41 13.5 45 16.7 45 3.4 23 37.67
Haiti 12.9 25 24.6 26 20.3 52 22 47 1.8 13 37.33
Uganda 9.78 13 15.2 10 7.1 30 3.7 25 4 25 26.67
Lesotho 48.93 58 0.4 2 7.2 31 197 52 2.6 19 34.00
Senegal 18.91 50 34.5 38 7.3 32 11.7 41 2.3 16 29.67
Tanzania 10.58 16 18.6 15 7.2 31 1 12 4.5 26 23.00
Yemen 7.1 6 16.7 13 2.6 10 7.3 33 -0.3 4 15.67
Cote D'Ivoire 14.26 31 27 29 4.9 20 1.3 14 1.3 8 14.00
Zambia 16.2 42 23.3 22 4.2 15 0.2 6 6.8 35 18.67
Nepal 13.86 30 69.6 54 4.7 19 26.6 48 0.4 5 24.00
Zimbabw e 25.3 57 55.3 51 6.3 26 13.7 43 2.4 17 28.67
Kenya 15.88 41 42.8 45 5 21 2.3 20 0.9 7 16.00
Cameroon 11.71 23 14.4 8 2.4 8 0.8 11 2.2 15 11.33
Nigeria 1.6 1 21.4 19 0.5 3 4.5 27 1.3 8 12.67
Djibouti 20.92 55 34.3 37 9.9 38 2.7 23 9 41 34.00
Bangladesh 9 8 59.4 52 1.3 5 9.2 37 1.4 9 17.00
Sao TP 14.61 33 32.8 35 12.2 42 5.2 28 11.5 43 37.67
Timor Leste 135 59 24 24 6.8 28 7.6 34 3.4 23 28.33
PNG 16.3 43 34 36 3.9 14 0.1 5 -0.4 3 7.33
Cambodia 11.09 20 36.9 40 5.7 25 1.6 16 8.6 40 27.00
Ghana 15 36 32.6 34 4.2 15 5.6 30 8 38 27.67
Uzbekistan 18.5 49 17.9 14 0.5 3 8.8 35 2.1 14 17.33
Lao PDR 13.62 29 26.7 28 4.4 17 0.7 10 4.7 27 18.00
Pakistan 10 15 46.8 47 1.3 5 6.3 31 0.6 6 14.00
Angola 16.46 44 67.2 53 0.3 2 0 2 -1.3 2 2.00
Congo Rep 9.43 9 -4.1 1 3.6 13 0.27 7 19.2 47 22.33
Mauritania 11.48 22 29.6 31 6.9 29 0.38 8 13.4 45 27.33
Sudan 6.19 4 21.6 20 2.3 7 1 12 2.5 18 12.33
Honduras 14.75 34 23.7 23 3.5 12 16.6 44 5.6 28 28.00
India 10.84 18 76.3 55 0.2 1 3.5 24 1.7 12 12.33
Tajikistan 16.5 45 15.9 12 4.3 16 38.1 51 2.9 21 29.33
Kyrgz Rep 18.2 48 14.3 7 9 35 28.5 50 9.2 42 42.33
Myanmar 6.6 5 27.4 30 2.2 6 0.8 11 3.6 24 13.67
Nicaragua 15 36 47.7 48 5.4 23 9.5 38 7.5 36 32.33
Guatemala 10.84 19 39.6 43 0.8 4 10 39 2.2 15 19.33
Vietnam 15.2 38 115 58 2.5 9 6.6 32 5.7 29 23.33
Bolivia 20.6 53 53.2 49 2.8 11 4.1 26 3.3 22 19.67
Cabo Verde 17.89 47 82.7 56 14.3 46 10.1 40 6.7 34 40.00
Moldova 23.2 56 40.1 44 5.6 24 26.7 49 4 25 32.67
Guyana 20.3 51 53.9 50 4.5 18 13.3 42 7.7 37 32.33
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CAR 52.86 20 0.20 8 2.42 40 16.07
Burundi 84.95 53 2.22 27 2.98 33 25.29
DRC 46.10 11 1.31 20 2.92 36 17.71
Niger 52.58 18 0.36 12 3.35 17 21.04
Malaw i 70.63 50 2.21 26 3.18 28 25.07
Mozambique 59.53 34 9.51 39 3.23 24 33.22
Guinea Bissau 35.10 4 0.11 5 2.46 39 12.86
Madagascar 52.28 17 0.23 9 3.23 23 16.04
Sierra Leone 54.19 23 0.13 7 3.47 12 15.71
Guinea 43.84 10 0.00 1 3.15 29 17.32
Togo 66.49 45 0.00 1 3.03 32 29.21
Burkina Faso 55.04 27 2.79 29 4.04 1 21.36
Eritrea 64.13 40 1.13 19 3.22 25 20.72
Rw anda 56.29 29 3.14 31 3.63 7 21.82
Mali 60.51 35 0.25 10 2.71 38 24.86
Chad 35.15 5 0.61 16 3.78 2 13.36
South Sudan 66.00 43 0.98 18 3.63 7 14.72
Benin 58.38 32 2.18 25 2.98 33 28.39
Ethiopia 62.00 38 1.67 21 3.50 9 26.29
Afghanistan 31.32 2 1.81 22 3.38 15 19.14
Comoros 54.36 25 0.46 14 2.86 37 26.61
Gambia 57.92 30 0.04 3 2.71 38 26.79
Uganda 53.65 22 3.72 33 3.36 16 23.50
Lesotho 90.96 54 0.00 1 2.97 34 31.57
Senegal 60.91 36 10.83 40 3.69 5 31.68
Tanzania 58.14 31 4.30 34 3.78 2 24.43
Yemen 35.76 6 0.37 13 3.12 30 14.36
Cote D'Ivoire 66.27 44 0.01 2 3.68 6 21.82
Zambia 66.54 46 3.55 32 3.30 20 34.36
Nepal 51.23 16 0.20 8 2.38 41 29.93
Kenya 66.77 47 4.73 35 3.35 17 31.18
Cameroon 47.19 12 0.04 4 3.34 18 18.36
Nigeria 33.83 3 0.00 1 3.30 20 13.54
Djibouti 65.27 42 0.65 17 3.39 14 32.96
Bangladesh 38.04 7 5.57 36 3.52 8 23.25
Timor Leste 24.27 1 0.35 11 3.08 31 29.32
PNG 74.99 52 0.50 15 3.19 27 33.79
Cambodia 41.50 9 2.61 28 3.28 22 24.04
Ghana 54.32 24 6.47 37 3.49 10 26.75
Uzbekistan 53.00 21 0.00 1 3.48 11 27.07
Lao PDR 50.09 15 0.00 1 3.21 26
Pakistan 47.54 13 0.00 1 3.21 26 19.18
Congo Rep 40.99 8 0.00 1 3.73 3 17.14
Mauritania 61.56 37 0.00 1 2.95 35 30.89
Sudan 74.00 51 0.00 1 2.95 35 24.04
Honduras 52.61 19 0.11 6 3.68 6 23.54
India 63.38 39 0.01 2 3.28 22 28.43
Kyrgz Rep 98.00 55 6.72 38 3.29 21 40.50
Myanmar 48.00 14 13.89 41 3.33 19 24.39
Nicaragua 65.00 41 2.87 30 3.70 4 33.46
Vietnam 54.52 26 2.03 23 3.69 5 31.43
Bolivia 58.64 33 0.00 1 3.45 13 30.14
Cabo Verde 55.47 28 2.07 24 3.48 11 36.57
Moldova 69.29 49 0.00 1 3.70 4 32.36
Guyana 66.87 48 0.00 1 3.30 20 32.11
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